Abstract In this paper we generalize the concept of Private Information Retrieval (PIR) by formalizing a new cryptographic primitive, named Extended Private Information Retrieval (EPIR). Instead of enabling a user to retrieve a bit (or a block) from a database as in the case of PIR, an EPIR protocol enables a user to evaluate a function f which takes a string chosen by the user and a block from the database as input. Like PIR, EPIR can also be considered as a special case of the secure two-party computation problem (and more specifically the oblivious function evaluation problem). We propose two EPIR protocols, one for testing equality and the other for computing Hamming distance. As an important application, we show how to construct strong privacy-preserving biometric-based authentication schemes by employing these EPIR protocols.
As a special case of secure two-party computation problem, the concept of EPIR is relevant to the oblivious function evaluation [8, 20, 38] . Canetti et al. [8] study the problem that a client privately evaluate a public function which takes inputs from one or more servers. Note that the client does not have any private input to the function. Naor and Pinkas [38] study the problem that a receiver privately evaluates a function f(a) by interacting with a sender, where f is a secret polynomial of the sender and a is a secret input of the receiver. Freedman et al. [20] study the keyword search problem that a client privately evaluates whether a keyword is contained in a database. EPIR can be considered to be a generalization of the these problems (in the single database case). Next, we briefly review some works which are related to equality test and hamming distance computation. In [11, 19] , the authors studied how to compare two commonly shared strings and determine whether they are the same. Freedman, Nissim, and Pinkas [21] studied two-party set-interaction problems and proposed a number of protocols. Du and Atallah [50, 17] considered the secure computation in an environment similar to that of EPIR, and proposed protocols based on solutions to Yao's millionaire problem. Goethals et al. [25] showed the weakness in the private scalar product protocols [16, 48] and proposed a new protocol based on homomorphic encryption schemes. Kiltz, Leander, and Malone-Lee [32] proposed some methods for a user to compute the mean (and other statistics) over the data in a database. However, they did not propose any specific security model for this type of computation, and their protocols either require a semi-trusted third party or are very inefficient in round and communication complexity. Note that Kiltz, Leander, and Malone-Lee [32] showed that some approach in [17] leaks information in some applications. Boneh, Goh, and Nissim [3] proposed an encryption scheme (referred to as the BGN encryption scheme) and used it for evaluating 2-DNF formulas. As an application, they showed how to construct efficient PIR protocols based on their encryption scheme.
Practical Motivation
Biometrics, such as fingerprint and iris, have been used to a high level of security in order to cope with the increasing demand for reliable and highly-usable information security systems, because they have many advantages over cryptographic credentials. However, there are some obstacles for a wide adoption of biometrics in practice. Among them, one is that biometric features are volatile over the time so that it cannot be integrated into most of the legacy systems. This means that approximate matching might be necessary for an identification or authentication. The other is that biometrics are usually considered to be sensitive, so that there is big privacy concern in using them. To address the volatility of biometrics, error-correction concept is widely used in the literature (e.g. [4, 5, 12, 15, 14, 30, 31, 45, 42] ). Employing this concept, some public information is firstly generated based on a reference biometric template, and later, a newly-captured template could help to recover the reference template if their distance (in a certain space) is not too large. In [34, 44, 45, 46, 49] , the authors attempted to enhance privacy protection in biometric authentication schemes, where the privacy means that the compromise of the database will not enable the attacker to recover the biometric template. Ratha, Connell, and Bolle [2, 41] introduced the concept of cancelable biometrics in an attempt to solve the revocation and privacy issues related to biometric information. More recently, Ratha et al. [40] intensively elaborated this concept in the case of fingerprint-based authentication systems. In addition, Atallah et al. [1] proposed a method, in which biometric templates are treated as bit strings and subsequently masked and permuted during the authentication process. Schoenmakers and Tuyls [43] proposed to use homomorphic encryption schemes for biometric authentication schemes by employing multi-party computation techniques. Practical concerns, security issues, and challenges about biometrics have been discussed in a number of papers (e.g. [2, 29, 36, 41, 47] ).
Despite these efforts, there are still some concerns which require further investigation. The most important one is that privacy may mean much more than recovering the biometric template. For example, an application server may not be trusted to store biometric information, and, even if an independent database stores biometric information, the application server's access to the biometric information still need to be restricted. In addition, it is also desirable to simplify the storage requirements for the human users and the (communication) client. Bringer et al. [6] proposed a biometric-based authentication protocol which protects the sensitive relationship between a biometric feature and relevant pseudorandom identity. Their protocol makes use of the Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme and is less efficient in communication than those described in Section 5.
Our Contributions
We generalize the concept of PIR by formalizing a new cryptographic primitive, named Extended Private Information Retrieval (EPIR). Instead of enabling a user to retrieve a block from a database as in the case of PIR, an EPIR protocol enables a user to evaluate a function f which takes a string chosen by the user and a block from the database as input 1 . If f is defined to be a function that simply returns the block from the database then the EPIR protocol is indeed a traditional PIR protocol. Analogous to the privacy properties of PIR, we define two privacy properties for EPIR, including (1) user privacy which captures the concept that, for any query, the database should know nothing about block index the user has queried and the user's input to f, (2) database privacy captures the concept that, from a single query, the user should obtain no more information than the output of function f. Note that we focus on the single-database computational setting in this paper.
We further propose two EPIR protocols: one for testing equality and the other for computing Hamming distance. The first protocol is based on a PIR protocol and the ElGamal encryption scheme (described in Appendix A) [18] , and the second protocol is based on a PIR protocol and the BGN encryption scheme (described in Appendix B) [3] . In both EPIR protocols, in order to achieve database privacy, the PIR protocols employed do not need to achieve database privacy.
As an important application, we show a modular way to construct biometric-based authentication schemes by employing an EPIR protocol. Due to the privacy properties of EPIR, these schemes achieve strong privacy properties against a malicious server and a malicious database which will not collude. It is worth noting that our proposal is not focused on a specific biometric, but rather on a generalisation of biometrics which can be represented as binary strings in the Hamming space. Iris is such a type of biometric that can be easily encoded into a binary string [28] .
Organization of the Paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the security definitions for EPIR. In Section 3 we describe an EPIR protocol for testing equality of two binary strings based on the ElGamal encryption scheme. In Section 4 we describe an EPIR protocol for computing Hamming distance of two binary strings based on the BGN encryption scheme. In Section 5 we propose two biometric-based authentication schemes by employing these two EPIR protocols. In Section 6 we conclude the paper.
Privacy Definitions for EPIR
Formally, a (single-database) EPIR protocol involves two principals: a database DB which holds a set of N blocks R = (R 1 , R 2 , · · · , R N ) where R j ∈ {0, 1} ℓ 1 and ℓ 1 is an integer, a user U which retrieves the value of a function f(R i , X) where X ∈ {0, 1} k 1 is chosen by the user, k 1 is an integer, and the index i is also chosen by the user. We assume that the description of f is public and N is a public constant integer. Without loss of generality, we further assume that the retrieval is through a retrieve(f, i, X) query.
Notation
We first describe some conventions for writing probabilistic algorithms and experiments. The notation x R ← S means x is randomly chosen from the set S. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then A(Alg; Func) is the result of running A, which can have any polynomial number of oracle queries to the functionality Func, interactively with Alg which answers the oracle query issued by A. For clarity of description, if an algorithm A runs in a number of stages then we write A = (A 1 , A 2 , · · · ). As a standard practice, the security of a protocol is evaluated by an experiment between an attacker and a challenger, where the challenger simulates the protocol executions and answers the attacker's oracle queries. Without specification, algorithms are always assumed to be polynomial-time.
Specifically, in our case, there is only one functionality, namely retrieve. If the attacker is a malicious DB, the challenger samples the index i and X from the distribution specified in the protocol and issues retrieve queries to the attacker. If the attacker is a malicious U then it can freely chooses the index i and X (that may derivate from the distribution specified in the protocol) and issues retrieve queries to the challenger.
In addition, we have the following definitions for negligible and overwhelming probabilities. Definition 1. The function P (ℓ) : Z → R is said to be negligible if, for every polynomial f (ℓ), there exists an integer N f such that P (ℓ) ≤ 1 f (ℓ) for all ℓ ≥ N f . If P (ℓ) is negligible, then the probability 1 − P (ℓ) is said to be overwhelming.
User Privacy
This property is an analog to the user privacy property in the case of PIR where user privacy captures the concept that DB knows nothing about block index that U has queried. However, in the case of EPIR, we wish user privacy to imply more than that DB knows nothing about the block index U has queried. Consider a toy example, in which an EPIR protocol is constructed as follows: U simply sends X to the database which computes f(R j , X) (1 ≤ j ≤ N ), and U then runs a PIR to retrieve f(R i , X). It is clear that, if the PIR protocol achieves user privacy then DB learns nothing about the index in the toy protocol. However, if f(R j , X) (1 ≤ j ≤ N ) are equal then DB knows the result obtained by U.
Informally, the user privacy for EPIR captures the concept that, for any retrieve(f, i, X) query, DB knows nothing about the queried block index i and the user's string X. Formally, an EPIR protocol achieves user privacy if any attacker A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 ) has only a negligible advantage in the following game, where the attacker's advantage is
In this game, the attacker A is a malicious DB. For the clarity, we rephrase the game as follows.
2. The attacker A 2 can request the challenger to start any (polynomial) number of retrieve queries. At some point, A 2 outputs (i 0 , i 1 , X 0 , X 1 ) for a challenge. Note that the symbol ∅ means that the attacker A 3 has no explicit output (besides the state information).
Database Privacy
This property is an analog to the database privacy property in the case of SPIR [24] and the formalization follows that for secure two-party computation [51, 26] . Informally, database privacy captures the concept that, from a retrieve(f, i, X) query, U obtains no more information than f(R i ′ , X ′ ) for some 1 ≤ i ′ ≤ N and X ′ ∈ {0, 1} k 1 . As in [24] , we do not require that i ′ = i and X ′ = X because a malicious U may construct the query without following the specification. The concept can also be rephrased as follows: U cannot tell whether it is an ideal-world execution and a real-world execution. In an ideal-world execution U interacts with a simulator which takes (i ′ , f(R i ′ , X ′ )) as input, while in a real-world execution U interacts with DB. 
In this game, the attacker A is a malicious U. For the clarity, we rephrase the game as follows.
1. The challenger randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 0 then simulator 0 answers the retrieve queries from the attacker; otherwise simulator 1 answers such queries. 2. The attacker A 1 generates N blocks R = (R 1 , R 2 , · · · , R N ). 3. The attacker A 2 can start any (polynomial) number of retrieve queries. At some point, A 2 outputs a guess b ′ .
We emphasize that the hypothetical oracle O may have unlimited computing resources. In an attack game, a malicious U may or may not generate a query by following the protocol specification, nonetheless, in order to answer the attacker's query, simulator 1 only needs to obtain f(R i ′ , X ′ ) for some 1 ≤ i ′ ≤ N and X ′ ∈ {0, 1} k 1 . As a result, if the attacker cannot distinguish the interactions with simulator 0 and simulator 1 , then, for each query, it obtains no more information about R than i ′ and f(R i ′ , X ′ ), which is what simulator 1 needs to answer the query.
Security of EPIR
Analogous to the case of other primitives, a (useful) EPIR protocol should be sound, which means that if both U and DB follow the protocol specification then retrieve(f, i, X) always returns the correct value of f(R i , X) with an overwhelming probability.
Definition 2. An EPIR protocol is said to be secure if any attacker has only negligible advantage in the attack games for user privacy and database privacy.
EPIR Protocol for testing equality
In this section we present an EPIR protocol which enables U to compare a string with a block from DB. The function f(R i , X) is defined to be 1 if R i = X and to be 0 otherwise. Suppose every block in DB has bit-length ℓ 1 , X also has bit-length ℓ 1 , and N has bit-length ℓ 2 .
The construction is based on the ElGamal scheme and a PIR protocol. It is worth noting that, due to the randomization in step 3, the employed PIR protocol does not need to be SPIR (achieving database privacy) in order to guarantee the database privacy for the EPIR.
Description of the Protocol
The EPIR protocol is as follows.
1. U generates an ElGamal key pair (pk, sk), where pk = (p, q, g, y), y = g x , and sk = x is randomly chosen from Z q . It is required that the bit-length of q is at least ℓ 1 + ℓ 2 + 1. Let "||" be the string concatenation operator. 2. To retrieve the value f(R i , X), for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N and X ∈ {0, 1} ℓ 1 , U first sends pk and an ElGamal ciphertext (g r , y r g i||X ) to DB, where r is randomly chosen from Z q . 3. After receiving pk and (g r , y r g i||X ) from U, DB first checks that pk is a valid ElGamal public key 2 and (g r , y r g i||X ) is a valid ElGamal ciphertext. If the check succeeds, DB computes C j for every 1 ≤ j ≤ N , where r j , r ′ j are randomly chosen from Z q and
4. U runs a PIR protocol to retrieve C i from DB. U then sets f(i, X) = 1 if Dec(C i , sk) = 1 and sets f(i, X) = 0 otherwise.
It is clear that, in our case, no encoding algorithm Ω is required to guarantee the semantic security of the ElGamal scheme. As to the performance, the communication complexity is dominated by that of the PIR protocol. The computational complexity is dominated by the computation of C j (1 ≤ j ≤ N ), say O(N ) exponentiations for DB. Moreover, it is straightforward to verify the following observation.
) are uniformly and independently distributed over G; otherwise C j1 is uniformly distributed over G and
Due to the bit-length requirement on q, if ℓ 1 + ℓ 2 + 1 is very large then the protocol may become impractical. Note that ℓ 2 will be bounded by a reasonably small integer (say 50), because it is hard to imagine that we have a database with 2 50 records. As a result, in this situation, a simple solution is to work on the records
and H is a collision-resistant hash function with a reasonable output bit-length. Inherently, U issues a retrieve(f, i, H(X)) query to retrieve the value of f(R i , X). It is clear that U gets the correct answer with an overwhelming probability.
Instead of employing the ElGamal encryption scheme, other homomorphic encryption schemes may also be used here though we will need a different randomization method in step 3.
Security Analysis
It is straightforward to verify that if the PIR protocol is sound then the EPIR protocol for equality is also sound.
Lemma 3 (user privacy). If the PIR protocol achieves user privacy, then the EPIR protocol for testing equality achieves user privacy based on the DDH assumption.
Proof. If the proposed scheme does not achieve user privacy (as described in Section 2.2), then we can construct an algorithm A ′ , which receives a public key pk from the ElGamal challenger and runs A as a subroutine to break the semantic security of the ElGamal scheme (or, DDH assumption). A ′ is defined as follows:
1. On receiving the output R from A 1 , A ′ sets its ElGamal public key as pk and faithfully answers the retrieve queries from A 2 . 
where ǫ is negligible. Otherwise, it is straightforward to construct an attacker for the PIR protocol. From this equation, we have the following probability relationships.
Based on the assumption that ElGamal scheme is semantically secure, then we get a contradiction. The lemma now follows.
⊓ ⊔ Lemma 4 (database privacy). The EPIR protocol for testing equality achieves database privacy (unconditionally).
Proof. Recall that, in the attack game definition for database privacy (as described in Section 2.3), simulator 0 is assumed to be DB. We now define a simulator simulator 1 which answers the attacker's query as follows.
1. On receiving pk and and (α 1 , α 2 ), simulator 1 first checks that they are well formed. If the check succeeds, go to next step; otherwise, abort. 2. Based on the auxiliary input (i ′ , f(R i ′ , X ′ ))) from the hypothetical oracle O, simulator 1 performs as follows.
where s 1 is randomly chosen from Z q , and for every 1 ≤ j ≤ N and j = i ′ , set C j = (β j1 , β j2 ) where β j1 , β j2 are randomly chosen from G. -Otherwise, for every 1 ≤ j ≤ N , set C j = (β j1 , β j2 ) where β j1 , β j2 are randomly chosen from G.
Faithfully execute the PIR protocol with U.
For the EPIR protocol for equality, the hypothetical oracle O generates its input to simulator 1 as follows.
1. Compute i||X satisfying (α 1 , α 2 ) = Enc(g i||X , pk).
If i /
∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }, set the input to be (1, 0). Otherwise, set the input to be (i, f(R i , X)).
It is clear that the only difference between simulator 0 and simulator 1 in answering U's query lies in the computation of C j (1 ≤ j ≤ N ). From Observation 1, the distributions of C j (1 ≤ j ≤ N ) are identical for simulator 0 and simulator 1 , therefore, A can only have advantage 0. The lemma now follows.
⊓ ⊔
EPIR protocol for computing Hamming distance
In this section we present an EPIR protocol which enables U to compute Hamming distance between a string chosen by itself and a block from DB. Especially, the protocol allows the user to assign a weight for every bit. For an ℓ 1 -bit string S, let S (k) denote the k-th bit of S. Let the weight vector be (w 1 , w 2 , · · · , w ℓ 1 ) where w k (1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ 1 ) are integers. The function f is defined as follows.
The construction is based on the BGN encryption scheme [3] , the GOS NIZK protocol [27] (described in Appendix D), and a PIR protocol. It is worth noting that, due to the randomization in step 3, the employed PIR protocol does not need to be SPIR (achieving database privacy) in order to guarantee the database privacy for the EPIR.
Description of the protocol
Suppose every block in DB has bit-length ℓ 1 . The EPIR protocol is as follows.
1. U generates a key pair (pk, sk) for the BGN encryption scheme, where pk = (n, G, G 1 ,ê, g, h), and sk = q 1 . 2. To retrieve the value of f(R i , X), for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N and X ∈ {0, 1} ℓ 1 , U first sends BGN ciphertexts c and c
are randomly chosen from Z n . In addition, U also sends proof k (1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ 1 ) to DB, where, for every 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ 1 , proof k is the GOS NIZK parameter for proving X (k) ∈ {0, 1}. 3. After receiving c, c k (1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ 1 ), and proof k (1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ 1 ) from U, DB first checks that pk is a valid BGN public key 3 and c, c k (1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ 1 ) are valid BGN ciphertexts. If the check succeeds, DB verifies proof k (1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ 1 ). If the verification succeeds, DB computes C j for every 1 ≤ j ≤ N as follows.
(a) For every 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ 1 , compute m j,k where
(b) Compute C j , where r j , r ′ j are randomly chosen from Z n and
Otherwise, DB aborts the protocol execution. 4. U runs a PIR protocol to retrieve C i from DB, and sets f(i,
As to the performance, the communication complexity is dominated by that of the PIR protocol and the transmission of c k , proof k (1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ 1 ). For U, the computational complexity is dominated by generating c k , proof k (1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ 1 ): O(ℓ 1 ) exponentiations. For DB, the computational complexity is dominated by checking the GOS NIZK proofs and the computation of C j (1 ≤ j ≤ N ): O(N + ℓ 1 ) pairing computations and O(N ) exponentiations. Moreover, it is straightforward to verify the following observation.
Observation 2 For every 1 ≤ j ≤ N , given that i = j, the components of C j = (C j1 , C j2 ), where
are uniformly and independently distributed over G 1 and the subgroup of order q 1 of G 1 , respectively.
and C j2 is uniformly distributed over the subgroup of order q 1 of G 1 .
Security Analysis
It is straightforward to verify that if the PIR protocol is sound then the EPIR protocol is also sound. First, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Given any M ≥ 1, the attacker's advantage in the following game is negligible for the BGN encryption scheme.
Proof. We only prove the case of M = 2 since a general result can be obtained by an induction on M . Suppose the attacker A succeeds in guessing b ′ with probability δ, then we construct an attacker A ′ for the BGN scheme as follows. The overall probability that Pr[
From the description of A ′ , it is clear that the following observation is true. | is non-negligible), then we get a contradiction with the semantic security of BGN scheme (or the subgroup decision assumption). The lemma now follows.
⊓ ⊔ From Lemma 3 and Lemma 5, we immediately have the following lemma because the protocol for testing equality shares the same structure as the protocol for computing Hamming distance. Because the GOS NIZK proof protocol is perfectly sound, the proof of this lemma is similar to Lemma 3, therefore, we omit it here.
Lemma 6 (user privacy). If the PIR protocol achieves user privacy, the EPIR protocol for computing Hamming distance achieves user privacy based on the subgroup decision assumption.
Lemma 7 (database privacy). The EPIR protocol for computing Hamming distance achieves database privacy (unconditionally).
1. On receiving pk, c, and c k (1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ 1 ), simulator 1 first checks that they are well formed. If the check succeeds, go to next step; otherwise, abort. 2. Based on the auxiliary input (i ′ , f(R i ′ , X ′ ))) from the hypothetical oracle O, simulator 1 performs as follows. For every 1 ≤ j ≤ N and
j where r j , r ′ j are randomly chosen from Z n . For j = i ′ , set C i ′ to be
where c = g i h r and r i ′ , r ′ i ′ are randomly chosen from Z n . 3. Faithfully execute the PIR protocol with U.
For the EPIR protocol for computing Hamming distance, the hypothetical oracle O generates its input to simulator 1 as follows.
Compute
set the input to be (1, 0). Otherwise, set the input to be (i, f(R i , X))).
It is clear that the only difference between simulator 0 and simulator 1 in answering U's query lies in the computation of C j (1 ≤ j ≤ N ). From observation 2, the distributions of C j (1 ≤ j ≤ N ) are identical for simulator 0 and simulator 1 , therefore, A can only have advantage 0. The lemma now follows.
⊓ ⊔ 5 Authentication Schemes using Biometrics
Preliminaries
In our security model, besides human users, we assume that a biometric-based (remote) authentication system consists of the following types of components:
-Authentication client C, which is responsible for extracting human user's biometric template using some biometric sensor and communicating with authentication server.
-Authentication server S, which is responsible for dealing with the human user's authentication requests by querying the database which stores user's biometric template. -Centralized database DB, which stores the relevant biometric information for authentication 4 .
Like most existing biometric-based systems (and many traditional cryptosystems), a biometricbased authentication scheme consists of two phases: an enrollment phase and a verification phase.
1. In the enrollment phase, user U i registers his biometric template b i at the database DB and his identity information ID i at the authentication server S. 2. In the verification phase, user U i issues an authentication request to the authentication server S through a client C. The authentication server S retrieves U i 's biometric information from the database DB and makes a decision.
Human users and S trust C to be honest, and S trusts DB to provide the correct biometric information. We further make the following assumptions on the system components: The communication links between any two components are authenticated and encrypted. In practice, the security links can be implemented using a standard protocol such as SSL or TLS. In addition, the following assumptions are indispensable for all biometrics-based systems.
1. Biometric Distribution assumption: Let H be the distance function in the Hamming space. We assume that, there is a threshold value λ, the probability that H(b i , b j ) > λ is close to 1 5 , where b i is Alice's biometric template and b j is Bob's biometric template, while the probability that H(b i , b ′ i ) ≤ λ is close to 1, where b i and b ′ i are Alice's biometric templates in two measurements. 2. Liveness assumption: We assume that, with a high probability, the biometric template captured by the sensor is from a live human user. In other words, it is difficult to produce a faked biometric template that can be accepted by the sensor.
However, how to achieve these properties is beyond the scope of this paper.
For a biometric-based authentication scheme, two types of security properties are mainly concerned. One is the resistance to impersonation attacks, in which case we only consider outside adversaries by assuming that all the system components are honest. The other is preserving privacy properties, in which case we only consider malicious inside adversaries including a malicious S and a malicious DB. But we assume that S and DB will not collude. In practice, many methods (for example, issuing a smart-card to every user) can be used to guarantee these properties against other kinds of adversaries, but we omit them in this paper since our main aim is to demonstrate the application of the EPIR protocols.
The First Biometric-based Authentication Scheme
This biometric-based authentication scheme is constructed based on the EPIR protocol for equality as described in Section 3.1. In this scheme, due to the secure sketch scheme, the user does not need to store any private information and the client C does not need to store any user specific information. The enrollment phase works as follows.
-C implements a (m, m ′ , λ)-secure sketch (SS, Rec) (an example is described in Appendix C),where m ′ is the system security parameter.
-S generates an ElGamal key pair (pk, sk).
-U i generates his unique pseudorandom identifier ID i and registers it at the server S, and registers (ID i , R i ) at the database DB, where b i is U i 's reference biometric template and
In addition, U i publicly stores a sketch sketch i = SS(b i ).
If U i wants to authenticate himself to the server S through the authentication client C, then the procedure is as follows.
1. C extracts U i 's biometric template b * i and computes the adjusted template b ′ i = Rec(b * i , sketch i ). Then C sends ID i to S and sends X to DB, where X = Enc(g ID i ||b ′ i , pk). Otherwise, C aborts the operation. 2. After receiving X, DB performs as in the EPIR protocol for equality as described in Section 3.1,
where DB computes C j for every 1 ≤ j ≤ N , where r j , r ′ j are randomly chosen from Z q and
3. The server runs a PIR to retrieve C i . If Dec(C i , sk) = 1, S accepts the request; otherwise rejects it.
It is easy to verify that impersonation attacks are prevented based on the biometric distribution assumption, i.e. an adversary can not force C to output U j 's template by letting C measure U ′ i s biometric, given that U i and U j are different human users.
Every authentication is indeed an execution of the EPIR protocol for equality between S and DB, though X is sent to DB by a trusted C. From the user privacy property of the EPIR protocol, DB learns nothing about which user is authenticating himself and what is the authentication result. In addition, DB obtains nothing about the registered biometric templates because they are encrypted by S's public key. From the database privacy property of the EPIR protocol, S learns nothing about a user's biometric template. In fact, S only obtains the information whether the authentication request is made by the legitimate user or not.
The Second Biometric-based Authentication Scheme
This biometric-based authentication scheme is constructed based on the EPIR protocol for computing Hamming distance as described in Section 4.1. In this scheme, the user does not need to store any private or public information and the client C does not need to store any user specific information. The server S is enabled to make its decision based on an exact matching between a user's biometric templates. The overall matching result can be more accurate by allocating a score (or a weight) for the matching result of every single bit. The enrollment phase works as follows.
-S generates a BGN encryption key pair (pk, sk).
-U i generates his pseudorandom identifier ID i and registers it at the server S, and registers (ID i , α
) at the database DB, where b i is U i 's reference biometric template with bit-length ℓ 1 , α
, and β ik (1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ 1 ) are randomly chosen from Z n .
If U i wants to authenticate himself to the server S through the authentication client C, then the procedure is as follows. h s k (1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ 1 ), r and s k (1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ 1 ) are randomly chosen from Z n . Simultaneously, C sends ID i to S. 2. After receiving c and c k (1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ 1 ), DB performs in a similar way as in the EPIR protocol for computing Hamming distance except that it computes C j for every 1 ≤ j ≤ N as follows.
jê (h, g)
(k) j )+β jk (1−2b (g, g)
3. S runs a PIR to retrieve C i , and computes d satisfying C We first emphasize that the GOS NIZK proofs are omitted in this authentication scheme because c and c k (1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ 1 ) are sent by C which is trusted by all parties.
It is easy to verify that impersonation attacks are prevented based on the biometric distribution assumption. Every authentication is indeed an execution of the EPIR protocol for computing Hamming distance between S and DB, though we have made some small modifications. As a result, this scheme achieves the same security properties as those of the previous scheme.
Compared with the previous scheme, this scheme is more convenient for human users and the the client C, where a human user does not need to store any information and secure sketch is not needed to be implemented in C. Another advantage of this protocol is that it works even when secure sketches are not practical (i.e. when noise is high).
Conclusion
In this paper we formulated the concept of EPIR and proposed two protocols: one for testing equality and the other for computing Hamming distance. The randomizations in both protocols are performed to avoid using a SPIR protocol in order to achieve the privacy for the database. In addition, the randomizations also guarantee that the privacy for the database is unconditionally achieved (without any computational assumption). It is a challenging task to design more efficient EPIR protocols, especially to reduce the computational complexity. In this paper, we also showed how to construct strong privacy-preserving biometric-based authentication schemes by employing these EPIR protocols. Some further work is required to evaluate the performance of these schemes in practice.
